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DRAFT

[95 NORTH CAROLINA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)]

SHOULD MUTUAL FUNDS INVEST IN STARTUPS? A CASE STUDY OF FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND’S
INVESTMENTS IN UNICORNS (AND OTHER STARTUPS) AND THE REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
Jeff Schwartz*
Mutual funds are acting like venture capitalists. Contrary to longstanding practice and
to their reputation for investing in public companies, mutual funds, including some of the most
prominent, are allocating portions of their portfolios to private startup firms, including famous
unicorns like Airbnb and Uber. Through a case study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s startup
portfolio, this article analyzes the regulatory implications of this development. I argue that the
new interest in venture investing poses several potential investor-protection concerns: lack of
awareness among mutual-fund investors, lack of liquidity for mutual-fund shares, lack of
venture-capital (“VC”) expertise among mutual-fund management, and lack of accountability
over how fund’s value their ownership stakes in startups for purposes of calculating their net
asset values, which creates an opportunity for management to manipulate such estimates.
Based on Magellan’s practices, liquidity is not a salient concern, but the other gaps
appear significant. Magellan’s disclosures on its website, and in its prospectus, statement of
additional information, and quarterly reports provide investors with little meaningful
information about the fund’s investments in startups. They also provide nothing to suggest that
Magellan has experience in this area. At the same time, however, the fund reports returns from
its startup portfolio that far exceed the public market and the VC-industry average. While
exceptional performance from a novice does not prove misconduct, it reinforces concerns about
the dependability of fund valuations.
To address the above risks, I suggest new rules governing how mutual funds value their
startup investments, which tie changes to objective evidence, and new disclosure requirements
that would shed light on the rationale for valuation changes and provide mutual-fund investors
with notice that startups are in their portfolios and that these investments pose certain risks.

*

William H. Leary Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law. I would
like to thank the organizors of the North Carolina Law Review’s symposium on The Role of Law
in Promoting Entrepreneurship for hosting an engaging discussion, as well as John Coyle,
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symposium for their valuable comments on this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been made of the proliferation of “unicorns,” startups with valuations of at
least $1 billion.1 The neologism, coined at a time when such firms were rare,2 now comes with
an ironic twist, as these firms now seem to be everywhere.3 One trend that has fueled their rise,
but attracted far less attention than the unicorns themselves, is that mutual funds—the somewhat
stodgy savings tool for retail investors with an eye towards retirement—have begun to act like
venture-capital (“VC”) funds—the flashy portfolio ornament for wealthy individuals and
institutional investors. Mutual funds were once content to invest almost exclusively in publicly
traded securities,4 but have recently begun allocating portions of their portfolios to these young
private firms.5
This Article analyzes the regulatory implications that arise from mutual funds amassing
VC portfolios. I argue that their investments in startups pose several potential concerns. One is
investor awareness. Since venture investing runs counter to historical practices, mutual-fund
investors might not realize that their funds are purchasing these atypical assets. Another concern

1

Andrew Ross Sorkin, Main Street Portfolios Are Investing in Unicorns, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/main-street-portfoliosare-investing-in-unicorns.html.
2
See Aileen Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar Startups,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-to-the-unicorn-club/
(coining the term).
3
See The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST. J., http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club/
(last visited, Sept. 30, 2016); Ben Zimmer, How Unicorns Became Silicon Valley Companies,
March 20, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-unicorns-became-silicon-valleycompanies-1426861606.
4
See Janet Kiholm Smith et al., The SEC’s “Fair Value” Standard for Mutual Fund Investment
in Restricted Shares and Other Illiquid Securities 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 421, 421
(2001).
5
See Tim McLaughlin & Heather Somerville, U.S. Mutual Funds Boost Own Performance with
Unicorn Mark-Ups, REUTERS, Aug. 11, 2016, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/usfunds-valuations-idUSKCN10M0CP.
3
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is liquidity. Investors expect to be able to redeem mutual-fund shares nearly instantly. Since
startups are private, however, their shares do not trade on a liquid market, which makes it more
difficult for mutual funds to meet their shareholders’ redemption expectations.
Finally, these investments raise concerns about competence and candor. Mutual fund
portfolio managers are not typically experts in venture-capital valuation, which casts their
investing decisions in this arena into doubt. Moreover, once they have made these investments,
funds are required to value them each day.6 With no market price to go on, these estimates are in
management’s discretion. These estimated values impact the price that shareholders receive
when they cash out and what newcomers pay when they invest.7 The lack of expertise in valuing
venture-capital investments may translate to flawed estimates.
Fund discretion in valuation also creates the potential for misconduct. Funds are
incentivized to choose high values, which among other benefits to the fund, makes them appear
more successful than their peers and increases the fees collected from investors.8 They might
also be tempted to smooth returns, that is, report losses and gains when most advantageous for
the fund rather than when they occur.9
This range of concerns should sound familiar to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the “SEC”). While the VC-investing trend is a new phenomenon, mutual funds have long

6

See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(b)(1) (2016).
See infra Part III.C.1.
8
See infra Part III.C.3. While this concern has drawn little attention, funds have made headlines
for marking down the values of their startups. See, e.g., Rolfe Winkler, Fidelity Marks Down
Startups Including Dropbox, Zenefits, WALL ST. J., March 30, 2016, available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fidelity-marks-down-startups-including-dropbox-zenefits1459346847; Rolfe Winkler, T. Rowe Price Marks Down Most of Its Tech Startups, WALL ST. J.,
April 16, 2016, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/t-rowe-price-marks-down-most-of-itstech-startups-1460759094.
9
For a discussion of smoothing, see AHMED RIAHI-BELKAOUI, ACCOUNTING THEORY 56 (5th ed.
2004).
7
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invested in other illiquid assets, such as mature private firms10 and thinly traded debt
instruments,11 which expose investors to risks similar to those noted above.12 That being the
case, the securities laws contain rules that are at least partially responsive. The pertinent issues
are, therefore, whether the existing, generally applicable, regulatory regime is sufficiently robust
to handle VC investing or whether, and if so what, specially tailored rules might be advisable. I
argue that entry into this new arena presents novel types and degrees of risk and, because of this,
suggest targeted reforms that would mitigate the investor-protection concerns that result.
To assess the extent to which risks to investors remain despite existing safeguards, I
describe the relevant rules, present a case study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s compliance
therewith, and scrutinize the fund’s VC valuations. Magellan is an iconic mutual fund. It is
actively managed, which means its portfolio managers select securities with the hopes of beating
the stock market’s return rather duplicating it like an index fund, and it has about $15 billion in
assets and 163 million shares outstanding,13 making it one of the largest and most popular
actively managed equity mutual funds.14 Most significantly, the fund is also an active investor in
unicorns and, as it turns out, other startups.15

10

See Restricted Securities, Accounting Series Release No. 113, Investment Company Act
Release No. 5847, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,989, 19,989 (Dec. 31, 1970).
11
See generally Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Securities Act Release
No. 9616, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736 (Aug. 4, 2014).
12
Mutual-fund liquidity has arisen as a concern at the SEC of late as funds have increasingly
diversified their holdings. See infra note 98.
13
See Fidelity Magellan Fund, FIDELITY, https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutualfunds/summary/316184100 (last visited Sept. 8, 2016) (number of shares calculated by dividing
portfolio net assets by the fund’s net asset value).
14
See William Baldwin, Mutual Fund Ratings: The Biggest Domestic-Stock Funds, FORBES
(Jun. 26, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwin/2015/06/26/mutual-fund-ratings-thebiggest-domestic-stock-funds/#4d7d69dd276b.
15
See infra table 1.
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There are several reasons why Magellan is an attractive fund on which to focus. Because
it is an industry leader with the resources to hire top counsel, its valuation processes and
compliance activities are likely suggestive of larger industry practices, and, more specifically,
because it is part of the Fidelity family of funds, its practices are likely suggestive of those at
Fidelity, which, as a fund family, is a leader in startup investing.16 In addition, even if Magellan
is an outlier in its approach to these securities, to the extent its practices raise investor-protection
concerns, its scale means that a significant number of individuals could be harmed. This alone
would warrant regulatory scrutiny.
Based on the above three-step analysis of risk, regulation, and case-study data, I conclude
that, while liquidity does not appear to be a concern, there is reason to suspect that investors fail
to realize that their mutual funds are investing in unicorns (and potentially other startups), that
mutual-fund investments in these securities are inadequately informed, and that the valuations
that mutual funds report publicly and serve as the basis of redemptions and purchases may be
inflated. The most significant findings are that Magellan’s disclosures surrounding its startup
investments and its valuation practices are opaque, and that its reported valuations indicate that
the fund has done alarming well with this portion of its portfolio. Its reported returns far outpace
its other investments, the venture-capital industry, and the public markets. Such success does not
necessarily indicate misconduct—it may owe to luck or skill that belies the fund’s inexperience.
Greater oversight, however, would provide increased confidence that the outstanding
performance owes to these benign explanations.

16

See Sergey Chernenko et al., Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns
19 (Jan. 10, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897254; Beth Healy,
Fidelity Funds High on Hot Startups, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan 13, 2007,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/01/13/fidelity-funds-high-hotstartups/ZzJMQHiFbLjBMsd2MNSNxM/story.html.
6
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While a study solely of Magellan’s practices cannot prove reform is necessary, the
findings and analysis herein lend credence to investor-protection concerns and, therefore, suggest
that reforms are worth consideration. I argue that stricter rules regarding VC valuation methods
and enhanced disclosures related to the venture portion of fund portfolios would go a long way
toward protecting investors.17
To limit the discretion over valuations that funds enjoy today, I suggest that rules should
mandate valuation changes when, and only when, based on publicly available information.
Funds would also be required to publicly disclose the information on which such changes are
based. To improve investor awareness, I propose rules that would mandate prominent disclosure
of the presence of VC investments and the risks they pose. Disclosures of varying length and
specificity would be necessary in certain advertisements and in several mandated filings,
including the fund’s prospectus (its primary sales document) and its statement of additional
information (the “SAI”) (a supplement to the prospectus with additional detail), the latter of
which would contain a separate section devoted to this portion of the fund’s portfolio. This
combination of substantive restraints and additional transparency requirements would enhance
the creditability of valuations and provide investors with adequate notice that their fund is
involved in the VC arena.18

17

See infra Part IV.
Because investors have historically shown muted interest in fund disclosures, mandating
additional transparency would have only a qualified impact. See ABT SRBI, MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS TELEPHONE SURVEY 56, 78 (2008),
https://www.sec.gov/pdf/disclosuredocs.pdf (finding that almost two-thirds of investors rarely,
very rarely, or never read mutual-fund prospectuses). Improved disclosures, however, would
reach some investors, and provide constructive notice that legitimizes the new practice of
investing in startups. Disclosure reform therefore serve as a worthwhile complement to the
substantive portion of this article’s proposal, which would protect everyone.
18
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Part II of this Article describes the rise of unicorns and the corresponding rise of mutualfund investments therein, the history of Fidelity’s Magellan Fund, and the makeup of Magellan’s
VC portfolio. In Part III, I discuss the investor-protection concerns that mutual-fund investments
in venture-stage firms give rise to and assess—through a juxtaposition of the current regulatory
structure against Magellan’s investing, valuation, and compliance practices—whether today’s
regulations are sufficient to protect investors. The analysis reveals gaps with respect to investor
awareness and fund-valuation practices for emerging firms. Part IV proposes reforms that would
mitigate these concerns.

II. UNICORNS, MUTUAL FUNDS, AND MAGELLAN
A. The Proliferation of Unicorns
Unicorns have upended norms in entrepreneurial capital raising, and in so doing, have
captured the attention of a growing number of mutual-fund managers. There are currently 154
unicorns,19 with Dropbox, Airbnb, and Uber among the most famous. Indeed, all of these
companies are valued at over $10 billion, which qualifies them for “decacorn” status.20 Like
these well-known firms, unicorns tend, by and large, to be Silicon-Valley-based technology
companies.21
Conventionally, companies with such rich valuations would go public to allow founders,
employees, and early stage investors to cash in on the firm’s success. Unicorns, however, have

19

See The Billion Dollar Startup Club, supra note 3.
See id; Sarah Frier & Eric Newcomer, The Fuzzy, Insane Math That's Creating So Many
Billion-Dollar Tech Companies, BLOOMBERG TECH (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insane-math-that-s-creating-somany-billion-dollar-tech-companies (noting use of the “decacorn” terminology).
21
See id.
20
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shunned this path.22 Travis Kalanick, the controversial CEO of Uber, captured the prevailing
sentiment when he said that he would take the company public “one day before [his] employees
and significant others come to [his] office with pitchforks and torches.”23
To remain private, these companies raise money under Rule 506(b) of the securities
laws.24 So long as they limit participation to “accredited investors” and comply with several
other restrictions, the rule allows them to collect round after round of venture capital without
having to register as a public company or provide investors with any specific disclosures.25 The
rules define accredited investors as individuals and institutions that meet certain financial
thresholds. Individuals must have a net worth of at least $1 million (excluding their principal
residence) or sustained income of $200,000 per year,26 while institutions must have greater than
$5 million in assets.27
Typical startup investors include “angels” and venture-capital funds.28 Angels tend to be
wealthy individuals who qualify as accredited investors.29 Venture-capital funds range in size,
but can have over a billion dollars in assets under management in their family of funds.30 The

22

See Jim Kerstetter, Daily Report: When Employees Want to Cash Out Private Stock, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/technology/daily-report-whenemployees-want-to-cash-out-private-stock.html (“It has become common wisdom among tech
start-ups that an initial public offering of shares is something that should occur only after all
other options have been exhausted.”).
23
Kevin Maney, Silicon Valley is Hoarding Wealth by Skipping IPOs, NEWSWEEK, June 27,
2016, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2016/07/08/silicon-valley-unicorns-ipo474898.html. For a broader discussion on the decline in IPOs and potential explanations, see
generally Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531 (2012).
24
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2016).
25
See id.
26
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2016).
27
See id.
28
See Stephen G. Morrissette, A Profile of Angel Investors, 10 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 52, 52 (2007)
29
See id. at 54.
30
See Tanya Benedicto Klich, VC 100: The Top Investors in Early-Stage Startups,
ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/242702.
9
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investors in venture-capital funds, technically limited partners, are all accredited.31 It is only
recently that mutual funds have shown interest in putting their enormous resources behind
emerging firms. Funds from the largest families, including Vanguard, Fidelity, and Blackrock,
have lately begun steering investor assets toward unicorns.32 Allocations have risen sharply over
the last few years and now total over $10 billion spread across over 250 funds,33 with Fidelity’s
funds leading the way.34 And while nascent statistics focus on unicorn investments, other
startups may be on fund ledgers as well. One surprise from this article’s study of Fidelity’s
Magellan Fund is that it has reached beyond these giants of the startup world.
While angel and venture-capital investing is strictly confined to accredited investors,
anyone can invest in the mutual funds run by these well-known fund families and their peers.35
Mutual-fund investors are not wealthy individuals seeking out risky investments in young
companies. They are retail investors, many of whom take part in mutual funds through their
workplace 401(k) plan.36 While angels and VC limited partners are likely to be sophisticated
parties (or at the very least have an interest in and understanding of investing), mutual-fund
investors likely give investing little thought. They may even fear and dislike investing, but
participate in mutual funds anyway because they have no other option to save for retirement.37

31

See Jeffrey Estes et al., Venture Capital Investment in the United States: Market and
Regulatory Overview, PRACTICAL LAW GLOBAL GUIDE 2015/16 (2015), available at
http://us.practicallaw.com/7-501-0057?source=relatedcontent.
32
Startup Stock Tracker, WALL ST. J, http://graphics.wsj.com/tech-startup-stocks-to-watch/ (last
visited, Sept. 20, 2016).
33
See Chernenko et al., supra note 16, at 30 fig. 1.
34
Id. at 19; Healy, supra note 16.
35
See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 521, 521 (2009).
36
See Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 53, 57 (2012).
37
See Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 256 – 58 (2010).
10
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They are the least sophisticated investors in the securities markets. If anyone needs protection in
the VC space, it is them.

B. Fidelity’s Magellan Fund
Magellan concentrates its investing in the publicly traded equities of large U.S.
companies, but has a pronounced newfound interest in startups.38 Founded in 1963, Magellan
grew from $18 million in assets under management in 1977 to $19 billion in 1990 under the
acclaimed investor, Peter Lynch, who averaged a 29.2% annual return.39 Even after Lynch’s
tenure, the fund continued to prosper. In 2000, it was worth $110 billion.40
More recently, however, Magellan has struggled. Over the last ten years, it has trailed
the S&P 500 index, as well as peer funds.41 As a result, it has suffered massive shareholder
redemptions and currently has assets under management of $14 billion, a large figure to be sure
but one well beneath its peak. While Magellan is still one of the largest equity mutual funds, its
rivals have gained at its expense.42
The fund is also likely a victim of broader headwinds facing actively managed mutual
funds. Empirical evidence has shown that investing in such funds is a poor choice. They
routinely yield subpar returns and charge high fees, leaving investors worse off than if they had
put their money in passively managed index funds.43 While the futility of active management

38

See Fidelity Magellan Fund, supra note 13.
Matthew Schifrin, Peter Lynch: 10-Bagger Tales, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/23/lynch-fidelity-magellan-personal-finance_peter_lynch.html.
40
Eleanor Laise, Can Anyone Steer This Ship, WALL ST. J., April 23, 2011, available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704547604576263183921903172.
41
See Fidelity Magellan Fund, supra note 13.
42
See William Baldwin, supra note 14 (including a table showing Magellan’s recent size ranking
among top equity funds).
43
See Laise, supra note 40.
39
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has been known for some time, the knowledge has only recently had a major impact on investor
decision-making. Index funds are now seizing sizable chunks of market share.44 In fact, the
threat index funds pose may partially explain the startup-investing trend. Since there is no
venture-capital index for passively managed funds to track, they cannot follow actively managed
funds down this untrodden path.
The table below shows Magellan’s venture investments. It has invested a total of about
$134 million since the second quarter of 2012 (when its interest in startups appears to have
begun).45 It held 17 unique investments in 12 companies during the period under review—the 16
quarters beginning June 2012 and ending March 2016. While 7 out of Magellan’s 12 venture
investments are in unicorns, the table shows that Magellan has been willing to invest in smaller
startups as well. In addition, two of the firms—Meituan and Mobileye—are international
companies (China- and Israel-based, respectively). Some of the firms listed below have gone
public, but they were all private at the time of Magellan’s acquisition.

Table 1
Fidelity Magellan Fund Startup Investments
Company

Acquisition Date

Acquisition
Price Per
Share ($)

bluebird bio, Inc.ˆ

July 23, 2012

.50

1,711,000

Preferred Series D

Cloudflare, Inc.†

November 5, 2014

6.13

3,502,000

Preferred Series D

October 21, 2013

5.56

90,000

Common Stock

March 3, 2014

13.18

99,000

Preferred Series B

DocuSign, Inc.†

Investment
Amount ($)

Security
Purchased

44

See id; Jason Zweig, Are Index Funds Eating the World? WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT (Aug 26,
2016 11:46 am ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/08/26/are-index-funds-eating-theworld/.
45
I reviewed quarterly filings going back to the fourth quarter of 2009. No startup investments
appeared prior to the June 2012 filing.
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March 3, 2014

13.34

30,000

June 29, 2012

4.64

11,000,000

March 3, 2014

13.17

71,000

March 3, 2014

13.13

1,831,000

Preferred Series E

Hubspot, Inc.ˆ

October 25, 2012

5.62

15,000,000

Preferred Series E

KaloBios
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.ˆ

May 2, 2012

3.40

8,000,000

Preferred Series E

Malwarebytes Inc.

December 21, 2015

10.37

35,000,000

Preferred Series B

Meituan Corp.†

January 26, 2015

6.32

10,000,000

Preferred Series D

Mobileye N.V.ˆ†

August 15, 2013

34.90

8,878,000

Preferred Series F

Nutanix, Inc.†

August 26, 2014

13.40

6,193,000

Preferred Series E

Pure Storage Inc.ˆ†

August 22, 2013

6.93

2,121,000

Preferred Series E

May 7, 2013

.91

11,000,000

Preferred Series F

October 1, 2014

1.30

5,000,000

Preferred Series G

June 6, 2014

62.05

15,000,000

Preferred Series D

Roku, Inc.
Uber Technologies
Inc.†

Preferred Series B-1
Preferred Series D

ˆ Indicates that the company has gone public.
† Indicates the the company is a “unicorn.”

The following timeline provides a sense of the scale and timing of these investments.
Since its first investment in May 2012, the fund has consistently backed several startups a year.
It had never invested more than $15 million until more than tripling that amount in its latest $35
million bet on Malwarebytes.

13
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Figure 1

Fidelity Magellan Startup Investments Timeline
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The above provides an overview of Magellan and its investment practices without getting
into valuation and returns data for the fund’s startup portfolio. This information is presented as
part of the investor-protection analysis below, in Part III.C.6., which assesses the performance of
the fund’s VC investments and weighs the soundness of its valuations.

III. INVESTOR-PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Mutual funds’ recent interest in startups raises concerns about investor awareness and
fund liquidity and about the competency and motivations of mutual-fund managers. While
current mutual-fund regulations partially address these concerns, an analysis of Magellan’s
holdings, disclosures, and venture-firm valuations suggests that the current rules provide
insufficient protection.

14
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A. Investor-Awareness Concerns
Mutual-fund investors may not realize that their funds are investing in startups.
Ordinarily, investors might be relatively unconcerned about the exact portfolio holdings of their
funds. After all, a major attraction of mutual funds is that investing decisions are delegated to
fund management. Venture investments, however, raise special concerns.
Although investors delegate stock picking to the fund manager, law and policy dictate
that the investors’ reasonable expectations for the contents of their portfolios set the boundaries
of that authority. Since mutual funds are known for investing in public securities, their stakes in
startups, which are private, are likely contrary to such expectations. The only way to insure that
such investments align with reasonable expectations is for funds to give meaningful notice to
their investors. The concern is whether they are providing it.
While the securities laws make no explicit appeal to “reasonable expectations,” the
principle has purchase in this context because of the contractual and fiduciary roots of the
relationship between the mutual-fund managers and the investors. The representations that
management makes about its fund can be viewed as outlining the terms of a contract between the
fund and its investors, who accept when they purchase their shares,46 and the principle that
reasonable expectations form contractual boundaries is a central tenet of contact law.47 For
example, when parties act in ways that are counter to the reasonable expectations of their
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For a discussion of the contractual nature of the mutual-fund relationship, see Wallace Wen
Yeu Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation of Structure and
Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927, 939-42 (1994). Lawsuits where management is alleged to
have violated the terms of the relationship, however, are typically brought under the securities
laws. See Richard L. Levine et al., Mutual Fund Market Timing, 52 FED. LAW. 28, 32-33 (2005)
(discussing legal theories underlying claims that funds failed to follow announced policies
regarding market timing).
47
See generally Jay M. Feinman, Good Faith and Reasonable Expectations, 67 ARK. L. REV. 525
(2014).
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counterparties, they violate the duty of good faith.48 Similarly, counterparties are only bound to
boilerplate terms if they comport with reasonable expectations.49 By extension, mutual-fund
investments are only appropriate if they match the reasonable expectations of the fund’s
investors. Given their history, investments in public companies like Home Depot and Apple
would fall within investor expectations, while VC investments in private companies would likely
fall outside them. Meaningful disclosure—the effect of which would be to expand such
expectations—is the only cure.
Part of why such investments would otherwise fall outside investor expectations—and
why this is worrisome—is the unique risks that startups, including unicorns, pose. Since startups
are valued internally, these investments present risks regarding the accuracy of their valuations
that are foreign to a portfolio consisting of the equity of publicly traded firms, where valuation
simply equates to market prices. The risks startups pose in this regard are even more acute than
the valuation concerns common to all fund investments in illiquid securities. Because startup
valuation is particularly subjective, there is more room for error and bias. These unique risks
make meaningful notice especially important. For notice to be meaningful, funds must provide
more than just a note that startups are present; unless investors are also informed of the
associated risks, they cannot plausibly be viewed as informed.
Fiduciary law buttresses the conclusion that proper notice is required. Because of the
trust investors bestow in them, mutual-fund managers are fiduciaries of the funds they manage
and, by extension, their shareholders.50 Fiduciaries may not violate the reasonable expectations
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See id. at 557.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. (e) (1981).
50
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 21-22
(2011); Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds:
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U.
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of those whom they serve51 and full disclosure is required if candor is called into question.52
These longstanding fiduciary doctrines suggest that—since investments in startups would come
as a surprise, and since the valuation of such investments raises concerns about management
integrity—mutual-fund managers should provide full and fair disclosure.
While the precise contours of their fund’s portfolio may not be generally of interest to
fund investors, startups are different. Core common law principles dictate that when managers
choose to invest in this unique and heretofore largely unprecedented asset class that poses
unusual challenges, they provide investors with clear notice of the practice and the concomitant
risks.

1. The Relevant Securities Laws and Magellan’s Compliance Therewith
The securities laws, primarily the Investment Company Act53 and the regulations
thereunder,54 contain a number of rules designed to provide investors with information about
fund holdings and to prevent misrepresentations with respect thereto. Rules about quarterly
reports, prospectuses, fund advertisements, and fund naming conventions are all relevant. A
survey of Magellan’s efforts to comply with these regulations gives insight into whether the
requirements are effective. While the fund provides information about startup investments in
response to such rules, it does not do so in a way that would be helpful to most fund investors.

L.Q. 1017, 1021 (2005); See also 15 U.S.C. § 80a–35 (2016) (discussing causes of action for
breach of fiduciary duty). Since the duty is technically owed to the fund, private causes of action
are derivative in nature. See id. at 1026; Anita K. Krug, Investment Company as Instrument:
The Limitations of the Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 263,
293-99 (2012-13).
51
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 383, 385 (1958).
52
See id. at § 390 cmt. (a); Langevoort, supra note 50, at 1021.
53
15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to a-64 (2016).
54
17 C.F.R. § 270.01 to 60a-1 (2016).
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Since Magellan’s disclosures appear compliant, the lack of meaningful information looks to be
the result of a regulatory gap.

i.

Quarterly Reporting Obligations

Mutual funds are required to file quarterly reports,55 and these forms must contain a
listing of their investments.56 A knowledgeable investor could pull the filings from the SEC’s
website and see, at least as of quarter end, what firms were present. Investors might recognize
the unicorns; if not, an internet search of unfamiliar names would reveal their presence. As
required, Magellan lists its holdings, including unicorns and other startups, in these reports.57
Despite their inclusion, only sophisticated investors would be able to pick out the
investments in young firms and understand the risks they entail. When Magellan and others
invest in such companies, they typically purchase shares in a particular series of preferred stock.
Since the rules require that funds include the nature of their holdings in their quarterly reports,58
Magellan notes when it has purchased this type of security. While seeing that a fund holds
shares in a series of a company’s preferred stock is a giveaway to sophisticated investors that the
issuer of such securities is probably a startup, retail investors would likely miss the signal.59
Magellan never plainly states that these are VC investments.

55

See 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-5 (2016).
See Form N-Q, Quarterly Schedule of Portfolio Holdings of Registered
Management Investment Company, OMB No. 3235-0578, at Item 1, available at
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-q.pdf; Form N-CSR, Certified Shareholder Report of
Registered Management Investment Companies, OMB No. 3235-0570, at Item 6, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-csr.pdf.
57
See, e.g., Fidelity Magellan Fund, Form N-CSR (May 26, 2016).
58
See Form N-Q, supra note 56, at Item 1; 17 C.F.R. § 210.12-12 (2016).
59
Even sophisticated investors would need to conduct further research to be sure. Such
companies are not the only ones that issue one or more series of preferred shares and, in fact,
public companies also issue them.
56
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The reports also provide only hints that such firms are private and the associated risks.
Footnotes appended to these holdings reveal that the securities are “restricted,” and Magellan
explains therein that restricted securities have not been registered under the securities laws.60
Unbeknownst to most, this means that such securities are not publicly traded, and the companies
in which they represent an ownership interest may not be public either. Several pages later, in a
discussion of “Significant Accounting Policies,” the fund explains a key risk associated with
private holdings, noting that restricted securities “may be difficult” to resell.61 The fund does not
further connect the dots in that it never informs investors that, when securities are difficult to
resell, the fund’s valuation of those securities is in its discretion; nor, of course, does it mention
the inherent problems with the fund having such power.
While Magellan’s quarterly disclosures may provide enough for sophisticated and
diligent investors to be wary, this is of little comfort, given that mutual funds are aimed at the
very people who would lack the knowledge to find the relevant information in these reports and
then ascertain its meaning.

ii. Prospectus Disclosure Requirements
The securities laws shape the mutual-fund prospectus as the primary resource for fund
investors. As such, it would be a promising location for disclosure of venture investments. At
least in Magellan’s case, however, meaningful disclosure is lacking.
Potentially relevant is that the rules require that the prospectus discuss, along with the
fund’s investment objectives, its principal strategies for reaching those objectives, and the

60
61

Id.
Id.
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attendant risks.62 Whether this broad disclosure mandate means that funds that invest in startups
must so disclose is defined by more detailed rules that expand on these requirements. As noted,
only “principal” strategies must be disclosed. According to the rules, whether an investment
strategy is a “principal” one “depends on the strategy’s anticipated importance in achieving the
Fund’s investment objectives.”63 To make this determination, in addition to considerations
regarding the amount of fund assets deployed pursuant to a particular strategy, funds are also to
consider “the likelihood of the Fund’s losing some or all of those assets from implementing the
strategy.”64 As part of its principal-strategy discussion, funds are to note, among other things,
“the particular type or types of securities in which the Fund principally invests or will invest.”65
Finally, to meet the risk disclosure obligation, funds must describe “the principal risks of
investing in the Fund, including the risks to which the Fund’s particular portfolio as a whole is
expected to be subject and the circumstances reasonably likely to affect adversely the Fund’s net
asset value, yield, or total return.”66 The wording of these rules provides funds with a large
degree of discretion in choosing what to say and how to say it.
Magellan did not view such requirements as necessitating disclosure of its venture
investments. In a recent prospectus, the fund describes its objective as “capital appreciation.”67
It explains that its strategy for achieving capital appreciation is to purchase “growth” or “value”
stocks or both.68 As for the type of securities that underpin this strategy, Magellan says it invests
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See Form N-1A, OMB No. 3235-0307, at Item 9, available at
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-1a.pdf.
63
Id. at Instruction 2 to Item 9.
64
Id.
65
Form N-1A, supra note 62, at Item 9(b)(1).
66
Id. at Item 4.
67
Fidelity Magellan Fund, Prospectus, at 5 (May 28, 2016).
68
Id.
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in equities, including “common stocks, preferred stocks, convertible securities, and warrants.”69
It decides how to allocate the fund’s money through “fundamental analysis, which involves a
bottom-up assessment of a company's potential for success in light of factors including its
financial condition, earnings outlook, strategy, management, industry position, and economic
and market conditions.”70 Finally, Magellan describes, in general terms, three categories of fund
risks: “Stock Market Volatility,” “Foreign Exposure,” and “Issuer Specific Changes”—none of
which mention, or have special relevance to, startups.
The fund’s broad descriptions of its strategy and the associated risks fail to clearly
indicate the presence of startups within the fund’s portfolio. Though Magellan does allude to
investments in preferred stock, as noted above, few retail investors are likely to connect this
disclosure to the fund’s practice of investing in emerging firms. Nor are the young companies in
which the fund invests listed in the prospectus. While Magellan’s sweeping generalizations
about strategy and risk theoretically capture venture investing, given the historical practices and
reputations of funds like Magellan, investors would likely view these disclosures as pertaining to
public equities. The institutional context means that only direct disclosures would reframe
investors’ reasonable expectations.
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Id.
Id. Form N-1A also instructs mutual funds to discuss non-principal strategies and the related
risks in their SAIs. Form N-1A, supra note 62, at Item 16(b). Magellan’s SAI contains no
additional disclosures, however, perhaps because the fund views its description of its principal
strategies and risks as broad enough to capture all of its investing activities.
70
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iii. Limitations on Mutual-Fund Advertisements
Extensive rules pertain to mutual-fund advertisements, including the contents of their
websites, but the only relevant requirement is that they not be materially misleading.71 This
backstop rule leaves mutual funds free to describe venture investments, but nothing requires
them to do so.
Magellan’s website makes no specific disclosures about its investments in young firms.
Rather, it reinforces the impression that Magellan invests solely in big public companies. The
top ten holdings list a series of household names including Apple, Facebook, and Home Depot.72
The included “Style Map” describes Magellan as a large cap growth fund that focuses on
companies valued at more than $10 billion.73 The message is that Magellan managers seek to
pick out the best investments from the largest listed companies.74

iv. Fund Name Regulations
A mutual fund’s name can play an important role in shaping investors’ expectations. A
clear and descriptive name could put investors on notice that startups are present; a vague or
misleading one, on the other hand, could imply just the opposite. Despite their potential to
inform, the securities laws do not harness fund names as a regulatory tool. Rather than prescribe
that a fund’s name gives some indication of its strategy, the rules police the boundaries of
naming practices.

71

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.156 (2016).
Fidelity Magellan Fund, supra note 13.
73
Id.
74
A particularly interested investor could find the fund’s list of holdings through a “Prospectus
and Reports” link on its website. See id. Investors are unlikely to take this step, however, and,
as noted in Part III.A.1.i., a portfolio list provides only part of what investors need to know to
understand the implications of their fund’s foray into venture investing.
72
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The central rule is that names may not be “materially deceptive or misleading.”75 In
discussing this language, the SEC has said that a name could be misleading if it does not fit the
investment strategy of the fund.76 Detailed rules police the fit issue in certain contexts.77 The
rules requires that if a fund’s name suggests that it will focus its investing on a particular type of
investment, like stocks or bonds, or a particular industry or industries, it must adopt a policy that
it will invest 80% of its assets in accordance with those representations.78 Essentially the same
rule applies to funds purporting to invest in certain geographic regions or countries and those
purporting to invest in tax-exempt instruments.79 If a fund’s name lacks such specificity, the
fund has a great degree of latitude.
The name “Magellan” takes advantage of this freedom. It conjures the image of the
famed Portuguese explorer, and in doing so, suggests boldness and exploration, but ultimately
provides no insight into what is actually in the fund.

2. Summary—and a Note on Scale
Magellan never tells investors that it invests in emerging firms; nor does it describe the
risks that the practice entails. Even worse, the two most likely sources of information—the fund
prospectus and website—leave investors with the contrary impression. In all likelihood, the vast
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d) (2016).
See Investment Company Names, Investment Company Act Release No. 24828, 66 Fed. Reg.
8,509, 8,514 (Feb. 2, 2001) (“[i]n determining whether a particular name is misleading, the
Division will consider whether the name would lead a reasonable investor to conclude that the
company invests in a manner that is inconsistent with the company’s intended investments or the
risks of those investments.”).
77
See 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1 (2016); Investment Company Names, supra note 76, at 8,509
(“Today the Commission is adopting new rule 35d-1 to address certain investment company
names that are likely to mislead an investor about a company’s investment emphasis.”).
78
See 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1; Investment Company Names, supra note 76, at 8,510.
79
See 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1.
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majority of the fund’s participants have no idea that Magellan has transformed them into VC
investors.
This is problematic even though, as of its March 2016 quarterly report, Magellan had
$166 million invested in venture-stage firms, which is only 1.1% of its $15 billion asset base. I
argued above that notifying investors of venture investments is important because otherwise such
investments would fall outside their reasonable expectations, and that adherence to such
expectation was particularly important here because of the fiduciary character of the managershareholder relationship and the potential for manipulation that such investments give rise to.
The relative size of a fund’s exposure vis-à-vis the remainder of its portfolio does not alter that
analysis. As is the case with Magellan, the absolute stakes can still be large. Regardless,
because of the risk of misconduct, transparency is necessary even if stakes are small (in relative
or absolute terms).80
This idea is reflected in central doctrines from corporate and securities law, which
mandate disclosure when there is the risk of manipulation, or where incentives are misaligned,
even if the amounts involved would otherwise appear inconsequential. Corporate law requires
complete disclosure of conflicts of interest regardless of amount.81 Investment advisers, like
Fidelity, are bound by the same standard.82 The strict nature of these obligations stems from the
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Nor does it matter that losses would be spread across the fund’s many investors. See Floyd
Norris, Pile of Pennies Is Adding Up to a Scandal in Mutual Funds. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003, at
C1 (discussing how small individual losses result in a windfall for those who stand to gain).
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fiduciary nature of the relationships at issue—management and shareholder in the former and
investment advisor and client in the latter.
In addition, although “materiality” is the guiding principle for disclosure in securities
regulation, quantitatively immaterial information has long been called for when there is the risk
of shareholder abuse. For example, nearly every detail of executive compensation must be
disclosed irrespective of the amount.83 Similarly, all conflict-of-interest transactions over
$120,000 must be disclosed—a minute figure for even the smallest public companies.84
More generally, the doctrine of qualitative materiality recognizes that misstatements with
respect to small amounts might be material if they implicate management integrity. According
to the SEC, a small misstatement would be material, for example, if it increases “management’s
compensation,” “masks a change in earnings or other trends,” or conceals an “unlawful
transaction.”85
Although Magellan’s VC holdings are relatively small, they still amount to an enormous
sum, and even if the fund was less exposed, the potential for misconduct inherent in such
investments militates in favor of disclosure nonetheless. That the presence of venture
investments, and the risks they entail, is never made clear to investors indicates noncompliance
by Magellan or a regulatory gap.

disinterested.” SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 50, at 22, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963) (emphasis added).
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See Regulation S-K, Item 402.
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See id. at Item 404.
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SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (1999).
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3. Inadequate Rules or Compliance Deficit
While Magellan could have done more to inform investors, it does not appear that the
fund fell short of its legal obligations. One could argue that, because of the large downside risk
associated with investing in startups, the strategy qualifies as a “principal” one necessitating
disclosure in the prospectus.86 But Magellan has a good argument that even large losses would
have a small impact on its bottom line: even a 50% loss would be one-half of 1% of its total
assets. One could also argue that Magellan’s website is materially misleading, but again the size
of the investment cuts against this position, and diligent investors can find holdings information
linked to the fund’s website.87 Finally, it could be argued that the principle of qualitative
materiality just described suggest that, notwithstanding the language of the rules, Magellan
should have included more information.
But SEC guidance seems to bless the basic and high-level disclosures that Magellan
offers. Rule changes in 199888 eased the disclosure requirements with respect to fund strategies
in an attempt to render the documents less lengthy and complicated.89 In proposing the rule, the
SEC even expressed concern that companies were unnecessarily discussing “illiquid” securities
that were not part of a fund’s principal investment strategy.90 The best interpretation of
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See note 62 and accompanying text.
See note 72 and accompanying text.
88
See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act
Release No. 7512, 63 Fed. Reg., 13,916, 13,916, 13,920 (Mar. 23, 1998).
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See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act
Release No. 7398, 62 Fed. Reg., 10,898, 10,900 (Mar. 10, 1997).
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achieving a fund's investment objectives. Disclosing information about each type of security in
which a fund might invest does not appear to help investors evaluate how the fund's portfolio
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Magellan’s conduct seems to be that it is complying with the rules, such as they are, but the SEC
did not foresee the venture-investing trend and sanctioned a level of disclosure that leaves
investors with inadequate information.

B. Liquidity Concerns
Startup investing also poses liquidity risk. The lack of a market for venture investments
runs contrary to the legally grounded investor expectation that they will be able to redeem
mutual-fund shares almost immediately. By rule, funds are required to redeem their investors’
shares within seven days of such requests,91 but the industry norm is to do so within one day.92
Since VC holdings are illiquid, and therefore unavailable to meet such requests, if a large
percentage of a fund’s portfolio is allocated to them, a fund might be unable to meet its
obligations in times of stress. Such holdings also threaten other aspects of the fund’s strategy.
With these holdings unavailable for sale, other assets must be traded to generate the cash to
repurchase shares from investors even if a fund would prefer to retain them.
Venture holdings are among the most illiquid financial assets. Like other private firms,
there is no active market on which to trade such securities.93 Much debt, in contrast, while
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2016).
See Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of
Comment Period for Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release, Securities Act
Release No. 9922, 80 Fed. Reg. 62,274, 62,277 (Oct. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Liquidity Risk
Management].
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See Schwartz, supra note 23, at 556-58 (discussing the rise and decline of private-sharetrading platforms like SharesPost and SecondMarket); Katie Benner, Airbnb and Others Set
Terms for Employees to Cash Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2016, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/12/technology/airbnb-and-others-set-terms-for-employees-tocash-out.html. The most likely avenue for a mutual fund looking to exit would be a sale back to
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appropriately described as illiquid, is often thinly traded.94 In times of stress, the relative
illiquidity of debt is problematic, but at least on a routine basis there is somewhere to sell. That
is not the case with startups.
To counter illiquidity risk and police the seven-day redemption requirement, SEC
guidelines limit mutual-fund investments in illiquid assets to 15% of their portfolios.95 The
agency defines such assets as those “which may not be sold or disposed of in the ordinary course
of business within seven days at approximately the value at which the mutual fund has valued the
investment.”96 Because the SEC has said that shares in private companies presumptively meet
this definition,97 startup holdings fall in this category.
In the context of equity mutual funds, where the remaining holdings are predominantly in
public companies, this 15% cap provides ample protection.98 Thus, so long as funds are

Chernenko, supra note 16, at 23 (finding that redemption rights are 15% more prevalent in VC
funding rounds where mutual funds are investing). Redemption rights, however, are little
comfort. See Scott Edward Walker, Demystifying the VC Term Sheet: Redemption Rights,
VENTUREBEAT (July 4, 2011, 6:00AM), http://venturebeat.com/2011/07/04/demystifying-the-vcterm-sheet-redemption-rights/.
94
See Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 11, at 47,813-814 (stating that “money market
portfolio securities are not frequently traded” and that “many debt securities held by other types
of funds do not frequently trade”).
95
Revision of Guidelines to Form N-1A, Securities Act Release No. 33-6927, 57 Fed. Reg.
9,828, 9,829 (Mar. 20, 1992).
96
Id.
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Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding Period of
Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6862, 55 Fed. Reg.
17933, 17940 (Apr. 30, 1990).
98
See Revision of Guidelines to Form N-1A, supra note 95, at 9828 & n.9; Jason Zweig, Buy the
ETF, Not the Mutual Fund, WALL ST J. (Dec 18, 2015, 1:19 pm ET),
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almost never halt redemptions”). Mutual funds are also investing in other illiquid assets, which
may pose liquidity challenges. See Kara M. Stein, Commissioner, U.S. Sec & Exch. Comm’n,
Mutual Funds – The Next 75 Years (June 15, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/mutualfunds-the-next-75-years-stein.html#_ftnref35; Liquidity Risk Management, supra note 92, at
62,281. For that reason, the SEC has proposed new liquidity rules that would complement the
15% cap. See generally Liquidity Risk Management, supra note 92.
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complying with the rule, there is little concern that they will be unable to meet their redemption
commitments. And Magellan does not come close to the 15% limit. The allocation to venturestage firms in the period studied never exceeded around 1%. Outside of one anomalous quarter,
its total investment in illiquid assets has remained below 2%.99 If other funds are behaving like
Magellan, the illiquidity of startup investments does not appear to be a large concern.

C. Investment and Valuation: Management Competency and Candor
Although the illiquidity of startups may not pose a major threat to the ability of funds to
timely redeem investor shares, investing in emerging firms and later valuing them gives rise to
significant concerns about management competence and candor. While regulations do little to
directly police whether portfolio managers are competent to invest in and value startups,
overlapping securities laws and accounting rules contain a number of procedural and disclosure
requirements designed to instill rigor and honesty into the valuation process. Despite its
safeguards, however, this regulatory approach appears insufficient. Judging by Magellan’s
disclosures and valuations, the risk remains that management is making bad investments and
then inappropriately valuing them.

1. Why Improper Valuations are a Problem
Bad investments are clearly harmful to fund shareholders, but flawed valuations are
problematic as well. In fact, because of the central role that valuations play in mutual-fund
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This nomenclature is discussed infra notes 152-155 and accompanying text. In the fourth quarter
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operations, the SEC has referred to valuation accuracy as “a primary principle underlying the
Investment Company Act.”100
Once a mutual fund makes an investment, it is required to ascribe a value to that
investment each day.101 These daily valuations are the key component of the firm’s net asset
value (“NAV”), which is the total value of the fund.102 When mutual-fund shareholders redeem
their shares, they receive the per share net asset value.103 This is also the price at which fund
shares are purchased.104 If this value is incorrect, both redeemers and buyers will transact at the
wrong price.105
To see the problem with incorrect prices, assume a fund’s venture portfolio and, by
extension, its net assets, are overvalued. Those redeeming their shares will receive too high a
price and those buying will pay too high a price. The excess returns the redeeming shareholder
receives are an indirect transfer from the remaining mutual-fund investors, who see the value of
their holdings inappropriately diluted.106 The buyer would also suffer if the investor redeems the
purchased shares after the valuation has been corrected.
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See Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 11, at 47,777.
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On a broader lever, exaggerated valuations causes a misallocation of resources in the
fund marketplace and between investors and management. Buyers may have been wrongfully
induced to invest in a certain fund based on the inflated values, which would have artificially
exaggerated past returns. The inflated figures would also have led to inappropriately high
compensation for the managers, whose pay is based on the NAV, and comes out of the returns of
fund shareholders. The multifaceted reliance on NAVs, and the potential harms to investors and
other funds that stem from inaccurate estimates of its components, underlie the importance of
getting valuations right.

2. Fund Manager Competence Concerns
There are a number of reasons to doubt the capacity of mutual funds to make wise startup
investments and then value those investments accurately. Venture-capital investing poses a
number of novel challenges for fund managers who presumably have built their careers investing
in public companies.
First, their skills do not readily translate to the startup world. While the fundamentals of
company valuation are constant, the particular techniques involved differ greatly across these
different spheres. Valuing public companies involves poring through SEC disclosures and press
releases to obtain figures that get plugged into models based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(“CAPM”) and its progeny.107 The key valuation figure is profits or some stripped down version
of it, like EBITDA.108 But startups usually have no profits and CAPM plays, at most, a modest
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See CHARLES P. JONES, INVESTMENTS 245-70 (11th ed. 2010).
See id. at 378 n.10. EBITDA stands for earnings before the deduction of interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization.
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role. Instead, valuation is based largely on guestimates of the company’s growth prospects.109
The process is much less mathematically rigorous and much more dependent on relationships
and experience.110
Second, the security being purchased is a different animal. On the public markets,
mutual funds typically invest in plain vanilla common stock. VC investments in preferred shares
involve much more complicated ownership and liquidation rights that would be largely foreign
to a public-markets devotee.111 Since mutual-fund managers do not live in the VC-world, there
is a distinct possibility that they are buying at the peak of a startup bubble.
Their inexperience in valuing startups also calls the subsequently reported valuations into
doubt. When mutual funds invest in publicly traded equities, there is no risk of misreporting the
carrying value of those firms. Because there is a liquid market, and a precise market price, the
NAV calculation is a matter of arithmetic. Since startups are private, however, there is no such
market price. Nevertheless, mutual funds must estimate a price each day—a task they are illequipped to perform.
Indeed, even valuation savants could not do what is being asked of these VC neophytes.
It is one thing to price Uber once; it is another to reevaluate how internal and external events,
nationally and internationally, shape its prospects each day. It is not as if startups are producing
daily audited financials and business retrospectives for NAV purposes; nor can fund managers
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See JOSH LERNER ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY: A CASEBOOK 181-200 (5th
ed. 2012) (describing venture capital valuation techniques).
110
See Mary Jo White, Chairperson, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the SEC-Rock
Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-initiative-3-31-16.html (“Nearly all
venture valuations are highly subjective.”)
111
See generally NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, SAMPLE TERM SHEET FOR SERIES A PREFERRED
STOCK FINANCING (2009) (providing for, among other things, governance rights, conversion
rights, and preferred liquidation rights).
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scour the global press each day for pertinent developments.112 Given these limitations, fund
valuations are inherently rough.113
Startups are even more difficult to value, both initially and over time, than other illiquid
assets. Mature private firms have historical returns to survey. They are also likely to have
public companies to which they can be readily compared. The whole idea of startups, in
contrast, is that there are no good comparables.114
Likewise, as noted above, much debt that is described as illiquid is at least thinly traded,
which provides some market data.115 In contrast, there is no market where startup shares are
exchanged and prices are publicly disclosed.116 The value of debt can also be more easily
modeled. Valuing startups is a guessing game, whereas mutual funds can use “matrix pricing”
for debt instruments, arriving at a price “derived from a range of different inputs, with varying
weights attached to each input, such as pricing of new issues, yield curve information, spread
information, and yields or prices of securities of comparable quality, coupon, maturity and
price.”117 While this process does not assure accuracy, there is more to go on in the analysis than
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See Lizette Chapman, Why Mutual Funds Can’t Agree on What Unicorns Are Worth,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201603-31/what-s-this-startup-worth-mutual-funds-can-t-get-their-stories-straight (according to the
CEO of Domo, Josh James, as quoted in the article, “People that aren’t experts at valuing private
companies are trying to act like experts,” James says. “Even when they have less information
than the VCs.”).
113
Some funds may be turning to third-party pricing services to assist in valuations. See Sarah
Krouse and Kristen Grind, Wall Street Cop Ask Money Managers to Reveal Silicon Valley
Valuations, WALL S. J., Dec. 9, 2016, available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-cop-asks-money-managers-to-reveal-silicon-valley-valu
ations-1481305082. If these services are experts in the area, then outsourcing valuations to these
parties relieves competence concerns, although the inherent difficulty of the task means such
valuations would still be guestimates.
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This is not always the case. Dropbox, for example, has a great public comparable—Box.
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See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 11, at 47,813.
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there is when trying to figure out what Uber is worth. Moreover, at least those investing in and
later valuing debt instruments for bond funds or money market funds, which are required to
invest in short-term debt,118 are ostensibly experts in debt. Unlike Magellan and its ilk, they are
not dabbling in something for which the fund lacks historical expertise.

3. Fund Manager Candor Concerns
Mutual funds’ ability to accurately estimate the value of startups at purchase or each day
thereafter is one concern. Worse still, there is a significant incentive for funds to massage the
reported valuations.
The most obvious abuse would be to exaggerate the value of the startups in the fund’s
portfolio.119 As previously noted, managers are paid based on their assets under management.120
By inflating the value of their investments, the asset managers make more. Inflating valuations
also increases returns, which attracts new investors and increases the likelihood that existing
ones stay.121 In addition, the higher returns allow funds to outpace their peers and the
benchmarks to which they are compared.122
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See 17 CFR § 270.2a-7(d)(1) (2016).
Hedge funds have recently drawn scrutiny for potentially overvaluing their illiquid assets.
See Jenny Strasburg, SEC Probes ‘Side Pocket’ Arrangements, WALL ST. J., April 28, 2010,
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703832204575210671819894474.
The incentive to inflate startup valuations may manifest as intentional misconduct or may take
the form of an implicit, even subconscious, bias toward higher values. Even a small bias can
have a large effect, however, because minor changes to assumptions can lead to major changes to
valuations. See LERNER ET AL., supra note 109, at 181.
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See Schwartz, supra note 35, at 560 & n.221.
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See id. at 546 & n.149.
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It could be argued that fund managers would not have an incentive to overvalue startups
because the firms eventually go public and the price transparency associated therewith would
necessitate a valuation reckoning. There are several reasons, however, why the incentive to
inflate would overpower the countervailing force of this contingency. First, many firms may
never go public. As discussed above, IPOs are becoming less and less common. If there is no
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Managers could also use their discretion over valuation to smooth returns. Rather than
consistently report inflated valuations, funds could time shift changes so that they appear when
most advantageous or least harmful. Along these lines, funds could report negative valuations
when the remainder of the portfolio is doing well and vice versa. This type of smoothing would
reduce volatility, which would make the fund appear less risky and therefore more attractive.
Funds could also smooth against their benchmark—reporting gains when they need them to keep
pace and losses when the fund can absorb them without falling behind.
While there is a similar opportunity for misconduct with other illiquid assets, the concern
is more salient with startups. The slipperiness of venture valuations means there is a wide range
of plausible estimates, making biased ones difficult to differentiate from mistaken ones. The
more latitude for abuse, the more tempting it is for funds to take advantage.

4. Fund Manager Competence Regulation
The securities laws do little to address the concern that mutual-fund managers are
reaching beyond their expertise. Investment advisers, like Fidelity, and their representatives are

IPO, there is never a public price. Second, even if a firm goes public, the prospect of short-term
gains may very will trump the long-term risk. This was one of the many lessons from the
financial crisis and is seen repeatedly in managerial behavior. See generally Lynne Dallas,
Short-Termism, The Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012).
Moreover, fund managers compensated based on the inflated values would not have to give the
money back, so even if they need to lower values at the IPO, they still would come out ahead.
Indeed, a fund manager who cheats may be long gone by the time of the IPO, particularly given
that the time from founding to IPO continues to lengthen. See BEGUM ERDOGAN ET AL., GROW
FAST OR DIE SLOW (2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/growfast-or-die-slow-why-unicorns-are-staying-private. Third, the valuations might become a selffulfilling prophecy (or managers might harbor this hope). If this were to happen, no downward
adjustment would be necessary. All of these considerations give managers reason to inflate even
if IPOs are possible.
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subject to a great deal of regulatory oversight.123 While the rules set minimum standards of
professionalism,124 nothing assures investors that advisers are acting in accordance with their
core competencies. The only protection comes from disclosure rules, but these provide only
limited insight into the fund manager’s expertise. The rules require that funds report in their
prospectus the business experience of their top portfolio managers for the last five years.125
Magellan’s responsive disclosure shows the limitations of this rule and bolsters
competency concerns. In a recent prospectus, Magellan says that the fund’s portfolio manager,
Jeffrey Feingold, has managed the fund since 2011, and that he has been with Fidelity since 1997
as a research analyst and portfolio manager.126 These sparse disclosures do little to help fund
investors evaluate Mr. Feingold; worse yet, the limited information provided suggests that he
lacks VC experience. Outside sources confirm this impression. According to the Wall Street
Journal, prior to Fidelity, Mr. Feingold was “an equity analyst following the footwear, apparel
and textile industries.”127 Whatever VC experience Magellan has does not come from Mr.
Feingold. While it is possible that the fund has made special hires to address this area, investors
would never know, as there is no basis on which to assess the fund’s overarching expertise as it
relates to this specialized area.128
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See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS (2013).
Investment adviser representatives are largely regulated at the state level. See SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, supra note 50, at 15, 86-87.
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See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 50, at 27-28.
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See Form N-1A, supra note 62, at Item 5(b); Item 10(a)(2).
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Fidelity Magellan Fund, supra note 67, at 14.
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Mary Pilon, Fidelity Magellan Gets New Helmsman, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2011, available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904265504576568793213103996.
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There were no media reports of VC experts moving to Magellan; it also seems like an
unlikely career move for already successful VC-fund managers.
36

DRAFT
Even though regulation does not directly address competency concerns, and what we
know about Magellan’s portfolio manager reinforces them, the nature of the fund’s investment
practices provides some comfort. As shown in table 1, Magellan tends to invest in later-stage
startups, choosing to usually take part in Series D rounds and later. These companies are less
risky than brand new ones129 and more similar to the public firms in which the fund typically
invests.
Moreover, Magellan often invests alongside venture capital and other private equity
funds. While these investors are fallible as well, that experts in the area are investing on
ostensibly the same terms gives some legitimacy to the decision to invest. Surprisingly,
however, Magellan has served as the lead investor several times,130 meaning that it has been the
first to sign-on to the investment and, in those cases, has worked with the entrepreneur to
structure the terms of the funding round.131
Magellan’s practice of investing mostly in late-stage startups and doing so alongside
experienced VC investors generally lessens competence concerns. But it does not eliminate
them. Late-stage startups are still startups and even VC experts make mistakes. Magellan also
makes investments where these mitigating factors are dulled. For example, Magellan, along with
one or more other Fidelity funds, were the only ones to invest in the Malwarebytes $50 million
Series B round—and Magellan’s $35 million stake in the round makes up about 1/4 of the fund’s
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See J.H. Cochrane, The Risk and Return of Venture Capital, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 3-52, 5 (2005).
According to crunchbase, a crowdsourced VC data repository, Fidelity led the rounds for
Uber’s Series D, Roku’s Series G and F, and Cloudflare’s Series D. See www.crunchbase.com
(last visited, Dec. 20, 2016).
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current VC portfolio.132 Finally, the safety of being flanked by VC firms only lends confidence
to the initial investment; the fund’s subsequent valuations, regardless of who participated in the
funding round, remain suspect.133

5. Valuation Regulations
Because mutual funds have been investing in assets without a readily determinable
market value for years, the risk of incompetent or biased valuations has long been a concern for
regulators.134 As such, there is a regulatory regime in place to police pricing practices, which
consists of both securities-law and accounting rules.
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See Press Release, Malwarebytes Inc., Malwarebytes Raises $50 Million Investment from
Fidelity (Jan. 21, 2016), https://press.malwarebytes.com/2016/01/21/malwarebytes-raises-50million-investment-from-fidelity/. Though $50 million is quite large for a Series B round, which
suggests that the company may have raised money prior to its Series A under a different naming
convention (e.g., Seed-1, Seed-2, etc.) without reporting it, this was not the case. See William
Alden, Malwarebytes, an Antivirus Start-Up, Raises $30 Million, DEALBOOK (July 10, 2014,
7:32AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/malwarebytes-an-antivirus-start-up-raises30-million/?src=twr&_r=0. Arguably, however, the round’s size itself makes this investment
look more like Magellan’s typical late stage entries. Even so, no VC firms participated in the
round.
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A potential check on these later valuations is that, from time to time, Fidelity invests with
other mutual funds in the startup rounds, which also must publicly report their valuations each
quarter. See Startup Stock Tracker, supra note 32. When this is the case, Fidelity, in addition to
the other funds, may fear reporting outlier valuations. This may lead to increased caution. Less
optimistically, however, the group dynamics may lead to herding or outright copying of the first
to report. One could also picture a feedback loop, where a bubble forms among these funds as
valuations ratchet skyward.
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See Money Market Fund Reform, supra note 11, at 47,740-741 (discussing valuation of thinly
traded debt); see generally Restricted Securities, supra note 10 (discussing valuation of private
firms).
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i.

Securities Laws Regarding Mutual Fund Valuation Practices

The central valuation rule from the securities laws is that “[p]ortfolio securities with
respect to which market quotations are readily available shall be valued at current market value,
and other securities and assets shall be valued at fair value as determined in good faith by the
board of directors of the registered company.”135 Since startup shares do not have a market
price, this means that the board needs to posit a “fair value” in “good faith.”
The SEC has provided guidance on the meaning of both of these terms. According to the
agency, “the fair value of a portfolio security is the price which the fund might reasonably expect
to receive upon its current sale.”136 The “current sale” part of this definition means that
companies must calculate the price that the mutual fund would have to accept today if it were to
sell, which necessarily includes a discount for the stock’s illiquidity.137
The fair value inquiry is meant to be comprehensive. Board members are to “satisfy
themselves that all appropriate factors … have been considered.”138 Such an analysis is to
include consideration of both firm-level information and information about external events.139
To comply with its duty to conduct the portfolio valuation in good faith, the board
members must act in accordance with “the duties of care and loyalty that they owe to the
fund.”140 More specifically, the SEC has instructed as follows:
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a fund board generally would not be acting in good faith if, for example, the board
knows or has reason to believe that its fair value determination does not reflect the
amount that the fund might reasonably expect to receive for the security upon its
current sale. In addition, a fund board generally would not be acting in good faith
if it acts with reckless disregard for whether its fair value determination reflects the
amount that the fund might reasonably expect to receive for the security upon its
current sale.141
Even though the rules allocate responsibility for valuation to the board and provide it
with good-faith guidance, in practice the board is not expected to value securities daily. Rather,
it must set up142 and continuously review143 policies and procedures for management to follow in
conducting the valuations. According to the SEC, “[t]hese policies and procedures should
encompass all appropriate factors relevant to the valuation of investments for which market
quotations are not readily available.”144
Disclosure requirements buttress the internal-controls rules. A mutual fund must explain
its valuation methodology both in its prospectus and SAI.145 Also, when they disclose their
financial statements, which occurs biannually, they must include a discussion of their valuation
procedures in the accompanying notes.146
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Finally, the values themselves need to be disclosed. Funds must independently report the
value of each holding every quarter.147 The securities-law regime thus boils down to a
requirement that funds enact, review, and update policies and procedures to value illiquid
investments and disclose their protocols and the resulting valuations.

ii. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
Mutual fund financial statements must adhere to General Accepted Accounting Principles
(“GAAP”), which include extensive rules on fair valuation in Accounting Standards Codification
(“ASC”) 820.148 ASC 820 is somewhat more prescriptive than the securities rules. It specifies
general methodologies for valuation (either based on discounted income flows or comparisons
with like financial assets)149 and a hierarchy of inputs in applying those methodologies.150 The
key to the hierarchy is the distinction ASC 820 makes between observable inputs, which are
preferred, and unobservable inputs, which are disfavored. Observable inputs are based on
market data whereas unobservable inputs are based on the reporting company’s assessment of
“the assumptions that market participants would use when pricing the asset.”151 In addition to
the observable/unobservable dichotomy, the ASC also groups inputs into three “Levels.”152 The
disfavored unobservable inputs are categorized as Level 3.153 Since there is no market for startup
shares, their valuation is based on these inputs of last resort.
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As with the securities laws, disclosure rules supplement the procedural rules. The ASC
requires a description of the fund’s valuation methodology154 and a breakdown of total assets
into categories corresponding to how they were valued (i.e., through Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3
inputs).155
Finally, auditors lend their assessment. Mutual funds must include audited financial
statements156 and an audited schedule of investments in their annual reports.157 For the audits,
rather than confirm final valuation figures for difficult-to-value assets, the auditors review
whether “the fund’s valuation method was appropriate in the circumstances and applied
consistently.”158
In requiring that companies use certain valuation techniques, describe their inputs, and
subject their analyses to auditing, the accounting rules require a degree of specificity beyond that
which is called for by the more flexible and general securities-law rules. Even so, Magellan’s
compliance illustrates that these rules do not add meaningful transparency and that manipulation
concerns remain.
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iii. Magellan’s Compliance with the Valuation Rules
Magellan’s disclosures shed little light on how it values its venture investments. A recent
prospectus contains several paragraphs on valuation, but the only relevant disclosure is that “[i]f
market quotations, official closing prices, or information furnished by a pricing service are not
readily available or, in the Adviser's opinion, are deemed unreliable for a security, then that
security will be fair valued in good faith by the Adviser in accordance with applicable fair value
pricing policies.”159 An expanded valuation discussion in the SAI provides no further insight
into startup valuations.160
The disclosures accompanying the fund’s financial statements go into more detail, but are
still too general to be useful. For example, in an annual report for the fiscal year ending March
31, 2016, the relevant disclosures are found in two paragraphs in note three to its financial
statements titled “Significant Accounting Policies.” The first paragraph is broadly responsive to
the securities-laws requirements:
The Board of Trustees (the Board) has delegated the day to day responsibility for
the valuation of the Fund's investments to the Fidelity Management & Research
Company (FMR) Fair Value Committee (the Committee). In accordance with
valuation policies and procedures approved by the Board, the Fund attempts to
obtain prices from one or more third party pricing vendors or brokers to value its
investments. When current market prices, quotations or currency exchange rates
are not readily available or reliable, investments will be fair valued in good faith by
the Committee, in accordance with procedures adopted by the Board. Factors used
in determining fair value vary by investment type and may include market or
investment specific events. The frequency with which these procedures are used
cannot be predicted and they may be utilized to a significant extent. The Committee
oversees the Fund's valuation policies and procedures and reports to the Board on
the Committee's activities and fair value determinations. The Board monitors the
appropriateness of the procedures used in valuing the Fund's investments and
ratifies the fair value determinations of the Committee.161
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These boilerplate disclosures stop short of providing substantive information about the
valuation process. They note that the board has put policies and procedures in place, but do not
describe their content. The second paragraph, which responds to the accounting rules, adds little
additional value:
Equity securities, including restricted securities, for which observable inputs are
not available are valued using alternate valuation approaches, including the market
approach and the income approach and are categorized as Level 3 in the hierarchy.
The market approach generally consists of using comparable market transactions
while the income approach generally consists of using the net present value of
estimated future cash flows, adjusted as appropriate for liquidity, credit, market
and/or other risk factors.162
Like the first paragraph quoted, this disclosure essentially confirms to the public that
Magellan is following the applicable rules, but provides no real transparency. The disclosure
suggests that startups are valued using Level 3 inputs, but does not describe the inputs or the
valuation technique the fund uses. Magellan’s disclosures appear to follow the letter of the rule,
yet sophisticated investors, let alone average investors, are left with little insight into the actual
valuation process.

6. Magellan’s Valuations
The final way to assess the risk to investors that remains despite the relevant securities
and accounting rules is to consider Magellan’s ongoing valuations themselves, which might
suggest incompetence, exaggeration, or returns smoothing. To gain insight into whether
Magellan’s startup valuations may be suspect, this section describes the fund’s VC valuations,
returns, and risk profile, and compares these attributes to the remainder of its portfolio, the public
market, and the venture-capital industry. This section also compares Magellan’s valuations to
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44

DRAFT
the market values of the same firms on the day of their public offerings. While this collection of
data, and the associated comparisons, does not show that Magellan was dishonest or inept,
putting the fund’s venture investments in context does not extinguish such concerns, and in fact,
reinforces them.163

i.

Magellan’s Valuations and Valuation Practices

Between the second quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2016, Magellan conducted
126 valuations of its venture investments. This is one valuation each quarter for each type of
security held in an emerging firm. In forty-one percent of the valuations, the fund chose to leave
the security’s estimated value unchanged from the previous quarter. It increased valuations 33%
of the time and decreased them 26% of the time. Changes came in all sizes. The fund made 20
changes of less than 5% in either direction. Its smallest change was -.9% and its largest was
+141%. While the number of positive as compared to negative adjustments was reasonably
similar, the scale of the positive adjustments was much greater than the negative ones. For
example, Magellan shows one loss of over 25%, but 16 quarterly gains surpassing that figure.
The histogram below illustrates these practices.
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It is beyond the scope of this article to more formally test the hypothesis that Magellan is
manipulating its valuations. The data presented herein, though, suggests that the additional data
collection and statistical analysis necessary for doing so may be worthwhile.
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Figure 2
Magellan Percent Change in Valuation Each Quarter
60

50

40

Frequency

30

20

10

0

Percent Change

Magellan’s approach to valuation evolved over time. As the bar chart below suggests,
the fund was much less likely to change valuations when it first began investing in venture-stage
firms. From June 2012 – June 2013, Magellan changed the value of only one holding (out of 15
opportunities). In contrast, from the first quarter of 2015 until the first quarter of 2016, it
changed 43 valuations (leaving only 17 unchanged). The chart also shows how Magellan’s
holdings increased over time.
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Figure 3
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ii. Risk and Return Data for Magellan’s VC Portfolio
Magellan’s filings indicate that its venture portfolio has been tremendously successful.
Among other things, table 2 shows its initial investment in such firms, its final valuation during
the period I reviewed, and the associated annual return. What stands out is just how well
Magellan reports to have done. Magellan shows a average annual return of 42%.164
Table 2
Fidelity Magellan Fund Startup Returns
Company
bluebird bio, Inc.(a)
Cloudflare, Inc.

Initial Investment ($)

Final Valuation ($)

1,711,000

13,489,000

(July 23, 2012)

(Sept. 30, 2015)

3,502,000

2,681,000

(Nov. 5, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

Yearly Return (%)
116
(17)

164

This is a weighted geometric average—a measure that takes into account how much Magellan
invests in each security and the timing of returns. See IBBOTSON, STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS AND
INFLATION: 2016 CLASSIC YEARBOOK 6-2 (2016) (presenting an explanation of geometric
means).
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DocuSign, Inc.(b)

90,000

241,000

(Oct. 21, 2013)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

99,000

112,000

(Mar. 3, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

30,000

34,000

(Mar. 3, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)
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6
6

11,000,000
(June 29, 2012)

35,456,000

71,000

(Mar. 31, 2016)

36

(Mar. 3, 2014)

Hubspot, Inc.(c)
KaloBios
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.(d)
Malwarebytes Inc.
Meituan Corp.
Mobileye N.V.(e)
Nutanix, Inc.
Pure Storage Inc.
Roku, Inc.
Uber Technologies Inc.

1,831,000

2,080,000

(Mar. 3, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

15,000,000

35,707,000

(Oct. 25, 2012)

(Dec. 31, 2015)

8,000,000

4,991,000

(May 2, 2012)

(Dec. 31, 2013)

35,000,000

35,000,000

(Dec. 21, 2015)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

10,000,000

12,214,000

(Jan. 26, 2015)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

8,878,000

46,431,000

(Aug. 15, 2013)

(Dec. 31, 2014)

6,193,000

6,903,000

(Aug. 26, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

2,121,000

4,148,000

(Aug. 22, 2013)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

11,000,000

18,570,000

(May 7, 2013)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

5,000,000

5,882,000

(Oct. 1, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

15,000,000

47,159,000

(June 6, 2014)

(Mar. 31, 2016)

6
44
(44)
0
19
135
7
29
20
11
88

Average Yearly Portfolio Return

42165

Standard Deviation

53166

(a) Bluebird bio’s final valuation does not include the almost $6 million worth of shares Magellan sold in the third
and fourth quarters of 2015; the returns calculation, however, accounts for the sales.
(b) Magellan’s June 29, 2012 investment of $11,000,000 and March 3, 2014 investment of $71,000 in DocuSign
were combined in Magellan’s reporting.
(c) Hubspot’s final valuation does not include Magellan’s sale of about $8 million worth of shares in the first
quarter 2015 and about $2 million worth of shares in the third quarter of that year. Sales proceeds are, however,
included in the returns calculation.
(d) Magellan purchased an additional $3 million worth of shares in KaloBios in the the first quarter of 2013. The
returns calculation takes the additional purchase into account.

165

This is the average referenced text accompanying supra note 164 rather than a mean of the
above annual returns.
166
This is the standard deviation of the startup portfolio’s annual returns.
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(e) Mobileye’s valuation does not include $1,000 worth of shares that Magellan held until the first quarter 2015.
The returns figure, however, takes this holding into account.

The bar chart below shows why Magellan has performed so well. Most of its largest
wagers yielded impressive returns. The only two investments resulting in losses involved
relatively small stakes.

Figure 4167
Magellan Startup Investments and Final Valuations
$50,000,000
$45,000,000
$40,000,000
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$Malwarebytes

Roku

Uber
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Meituan

Initial Investment

Mobileye

KaloBios

Nutanix

Cloudflare

Pure Storage bluebird bio

Final Valuation

The following figure shows the returns associated with Magellan’s valuations.
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The figure combines multiple rounds of investments in Roku and DocuSign. Otherwise, it
reflects the dollar figures in table 2.
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Figure 5
Magellan Startup Returns
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Any discussion of portfolio performance must also account for risk. Standard deviation
is the typical measure, which is based on the principle that the wider the dispersion of outcomes
(in this case, returns), the greater the risk.168 A higher standard deviation indicates a wider
dispersion. In Magellan’s case, the standard deviation of yearly returns was 53%. This figure is
based on a small number of observations, but like annual returns data, it nevertheless provides a
numerical basis for comparison across different asset classes over the same time period.

ii. Comparative Analysis of Magellan’s VC Returns and Risk
Magellan’s venture investments significantly outperformed the venture-capital industry,
the public market, and the remainder of its portfolio. Table 3 shows how Magellan’s
performance stacks up against these comparables for the three years where there is complete VC
data.

168

See IBBOTSON, supra note 164, at 6-3 (2016).
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Table 3169
Yearly Return Comparisons
Magellan
Startup
Portfolio (%)

Venture
Capital
Industry (%)

Magellan
Total Returns
(%)

S&P 500
Returns (%)

June 30, 2012 –
June 30, 2013

-6

19.7

20 (-.06)

21

June 30, 2013 –
June 30, 2014

65

25.9

29 (+.15)

25

June 30, 2014 –
June 30, 2015

101

20.5

11 (+.56)

7

Over 3-Year
Period

59

22

20 (+.22)

17

From June 2012 to June 2015, Magellan far outpaced the venture-capital industry,
earning a 59% return compared to the industry’s 22%. Such performance is more remarkable
because, as shown in table 1, Magellan has usually invested in later rounds, which should
generate lower returns (and lower risks).170 Also, venture-capital returns follow a power-law
distribution. A few funds earn outsized returns while the remainder falter.171 That Magellan

169

Venture capital returns are internal rates of return (“IRRs”) based on data from Preqin. See
PREQIN, LTD., THE Q1 2016 PREQIN QUARTERLY UPDATE 11 (2016), available at
https://www.preqin.com/docs/quarterly/pe/Preqin-Quarterly-Private-Equity-Update-Q12016.pdf; William Alden, Venture Capital Outpaces Buyouts in Investment Returns, Jan. 21,
2015 (citing Preqin data). IRR calculations in the VC industry typically include interim
valuations and are not solely based on limited partner cash flows. See JOE STEER & COLIN ELLIS,
ARE UK VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY VALUATIONS OVER-OPTIMISTIC? 4 (2011).
The parentheses in the Magellan total returns column are estimates of the startup portfolio’s
contribution to the total return each period. Total returns and S&P 500 returns are based on data
from Morningstar. See MORNINGSTAR, Fidelity Magellan,
http://beta.morningstar.com/funds/XNAS/FMAGX/quote.html (last visited, Dec 21., 2016).
170
See Cochrane, supra note 129, at 5.
171
DIANE MULCAHY ET AL., WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY … AND HE IS US 21 (2012), available at
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2012/0
5/we_have_met_the_enemy_and_he_is_us.pdf.Kauffman.
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finds itself on the right side of this equation is surprising,172 given that newcomers and non-VC
funds that dabble in private equity tend to do poorly.173
Also notable is that the strong venture-capital returns depicted in this table belie a long
history of lackluster performance in the industry. While funds that began in 2005 have a median
return of 14%, those that began in 2005 show returns of only 3%.174 A Kauffman Foundation
study from 2012 concluded, based on returns data, that venture funds “haven’t beaten the public
market for most of the past decade.”175 Magellan is thus a standout in the industry at a time
when the industry is dong particularly well.
Magellan’s venture returns also far exceed the stock market as a whole and Magellan’s
public investments. As shown in the above table, Magellan’s 59% return in the three years from
June 2012 through June 2015 dwarfs the 17% return on the S&P 500 index and 20% return on
the rest of the fund’s portfolio. Moreover, as noted above, from the June 2012 until March 2016,
Magellan earned 42%. The S&P 500 returned about 14%, and the remainder of Magellan’s
portfolio returned about 14.7% over the same period.
The returns on Magellan’s startup investments have played a small, but noticeable role in
the fund’s overall performance. As the table indicates, the venture portfolio caused the overall
return to fall 6 basis points from June 2012 to June 2013 and to rise 15 basis points and 56 basis

172

Based on Cambridge Associate’s historical data, Magellan’s returns would likely place it in
the top quartile. In the period from 1981 – 2014 (34 years), this group had annual returns of over
30% only 8 times and over 40% only 4 times. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCIATES, U.S. VENTURE CAPITAL
INDEX AND SELECTED BENCHMARK STATISTICS 8 (2016).
173
University endowments are the exception. See JOSH LERNER, PRIVATE EQUITY RETURNS:
MYTH AND REALITY 21-28, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/Session%20III%20-%20Lerner%20FINAL.pdf.
174
Alden, supra note 169.
175
MULCAHY ET AL., supra note 171, at 6.
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points in the following two years.176 The above table does not show the difference that the
venture investments made to quarterly returns. As with annual returns, the change was usually a
matter of basis points, but one quarter, the fund had a 614% return on its startup portfolio, and
that quarter the venture portfolio increased the aggregate return by more than 3% (from 7.8% to
11%).177
Magellan’s high venture returns have been accompanied by the aforementioned 53%
standard deviation, which implies a high level of risk. The S&P 500 had a standard deviation of
only 9% over the three years included in the above table. Historically, the standard deviation is
20% for large-cap stocks and 32% for small caps.178
Perhaps more surprising, the standard deviation of Magellan’s returns also exceed those
of VC funds, even though it focuses primarily on later-stage startups, which should be more
stable.179 For the three years included in the chart above, the annual standard deviation in VC
returns is 3.7%. This was a relatively calm time for the industry, which averages a standard
deviation of 11.7%.180
These numerical comparisons, however, overstate the riskiness of Magellan’s
investments. Though less tidy, a better way to look at risk in this context is to focus on the
frequency and depth of losses. This perspective causes Magellan’s risk to disappear. Only two
of the fund’s investments have failed to generate a positive return, and only one—KaloBios—is
severely underwater.

176

The small overall affect despite the large VC returns owes to the relatively small portion of
the portfolio allocated to startups. See infra Part III.A.2.
177
The 614% figure is an annualized return.
178
See IBBOTSON, supra note 164, at 2-6 exhibit 2.3.
179
See Cochrane, supra note 129, at 5.
180
This is based on the variation in the annual VC returns reported by Cambridge Associates.
See CAMBRIDGE ASSOCIATES, supra note 172, at 6.
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This is in contrast to venture capital as a whole, where three out of four investments fail
to return investor capital.181 Magellan’s focus on more mature firms likely explains part of its
success in avoiding steep losses, but the increased stability of such firms should be accompanied
by decreased returns—which has not been the case for Magellan.182
Magellan appears to have done something that has long eluded industry veterans. In its
first foray into venture capital, it has invested (essentially) only in winners. While not all of its
investments have been homeruns, they have almost uniformly yielded positive returns. The
spread of returns implies riskiness, but the risk that matters is largely absent.
When further refined, the data continues to present this picture of success. The above
analysis of Magellan’s total returns from its VC portfolio includes returns derived from after
startups have gone public. While a complete picture of Magellan’s VC portfolio returns is a
useful yardstick, since the valuations for publicly traded firms and the post-IPO returns that stem
therefrom are based on market prices, excluding this portion of the fund’s VC returns from the
data presents a more precise picture of Magellan’s pre-IPO valuation practices.
When the public valuations are excluded, the average annual return drops from 42% to
30%. The new figure, while somewhat less impressive, still compares very favorably to the VC
industry (18.2%),183 to the public market (14%), and to the remainder of Magellan’s portfolio
(14.7%). Reduced risk accompanies the reduced returns. The standard deviation drops to 31%
and the fund’s biggest loss disappears. Its investment in KaloBios only showed signs of trouble

181

Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 out of 4 Startups Fail, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20,
2012.
182
See Cochrane, supra note 129, at 5.
183
This is the return for the VC industry for the three years ending December 2015. PREQIN,
LTD., THE Q1 2016 PREQIN QUARTERLY UPDATE 11 (2016). Its performance would place
Magellan in the top quartile of VC funds in about 70% of years. See supra note 172.
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after it went public. The reason for the overall reduced returns and risk despite KaloBios’s
struggles is that Magellan’s investments in bluebird bio (which it held for more than 2 years after
its IPO) and Mobileye (which it held for a couple of quarters) skyrocketed after going public.

iii. Comparative Analysis of Firm-Level Valuations—Before and After the IPO
Comparing the performance and risk of Magellan’s VC portfolio to those of alternative
investments is one way to assess the fund’s valuations. Another approach is to compare the
fund’s private valuations for firms that went public to the IPO prices for those firms or, better
yet, to the prices for those firms after the first day of trading. The latter would be more telling
because it reflects market prices rather than the price paid by the IPO syndicate, which typically
reflects a discount.184 A good match between Magellan’s price and the trading price would seem
to indicate that Magellan is appropriately tracking the value of its investments.185 Table 4 shows
this information.

184

See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Why I.P.O.’s Get Underpriced (May 27, 2011, 10:48AM),
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/why-i-p-o-s-getunderpriced/?_r=0.
185
Venture capitalists typically price their preferred shares as if they were common stock,
ignoring the value of the downside protection. Robert Bartlett III, A Founders Guide to Unicorn
Creation 3 (forthcoming in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (Steven
Davidoff-Solomon & Clair A. Hill eds.)). When it is clear that a company is going public,
however, the distinction evaporates because protection from downside risk is irrelevant. Private
and public valuations should, therefore, largely align (although a liquidity discount to reflect any
lockup period would be defensible).
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Table 4186
Initial Public Offerings Data
Company
bluebird bio, Inc.

Hubspot, Inc.
KaloBios
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
Mobileye N.V.

Pure Storage Inc.

Highest Internal
Valuation ($)
.78
(March 31, 2013)

10.17
(Mar. 31, 2014)

Final Internal
Valuation ($)
.78 (14.80)
(March 31, 2013 /
May 28, 2013)

7.50 (22.50)
(Sept. 30, 2014 /
Nov. 20, 2014)

3.40

3.40 (12.11)

(June 30, 2012 –
Dec. 31, 2012)

(Dec. 31, 2012 /
Feb. 28, 2012)

34.90

34.90 (6.98)

(Sept. 30, 2013 –
June 30, 2014)

(June 30, 2014 /
Aug. 29, 2014)

18.67
(June 30, 2015)

15.30
(Sept. 30, 2015 /
Nov. 30, 2015)

IPO Price ($)

End of First Day
of Trading

17

26.91

(June 18, 2013)

(June 19, 2013)

25

30.10

(Oct. 9, 2014)

(Oct. 9, 2014)

8

7.95

(Jan. 31, 2013)

(Jan 31, 2013)

25

37

(July 31, 2014)

(Aug. 1, 2014)

17

16.01

(Oct. 6, 2015)

(Oct. 7, 2015)

What stands out is how far off Magellan’s valuations were from the market values of the
same firms at the end of the first day of trading. Magellan overvalued KaloBios by 34%. The
fund’s valuation was low, but reasonably close for Pure Storage (5% off), and far too low for
Hubspot (34% off), Mobileye (430% off) and bluebird bio (82% off).

186

The first dates listed in the “Final Internal Valuation” column are the quarter ending dates for
the quarterly reports reflecting the noted valuation. The dates after the slashes are the actual
filing dates for those reports. The prices in parentheses in that column represent what the fund’s
reported price equates to accounting for stock splits at or around the time of the IPO and for the
rate at which the fund’s holdings covert into common stock. For example, Magellan’s valuation
for bluebird bio for the first quarter of 2013, which ended March 31, 2013, was $.78. Magellan
filed the quarterly report listing this valuation on May 28, 2013. Bluebird bio conducted a onefor 18.967 reverse stock split shortly before its IPO and Magellan’s shares were eligible to
convert on a one-to-one basis. Taking this into account, the $.78 per share valuation, as of
March 2013, equates to a $14.80 valuation at the time of the IPO.
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These discrepancies are difficult to explain. SEC rules provide funds with 60 or more
days to file their quarterly reports187—and Magellan takes full advantage. As Table 4 shows, in
four out of five cases, this meant that Magellan filed its report listing its valuation estimate for
the firm after its IPO. In the other case, bluebird bio, Magellan filed about three weeks prior.
Thus, with the exception of bluebird bio, Magellan had actual price data to inform its valuations.
So informed, the fund’s valuations for the quarter ending prior to the IPO should closely align
with the subsequent, but closely timed, market prices.
Looking more closely at the data, in two cases, Mobileye and KaloBios, Magellan never
changed its quarterly valuations prior to the IPOs. Hubspot’s and Pure Storage’s valuations were
lowered in the months prior to the public offering (which might suggest an adjustment in
anticipation of the event and the value clarity it brings). As for bluebird bio, Magellan only held
the firm for 3 quarters prior to its IPO and marked up the stock by 56% in the quarter prior to the
offering.
A valuation process that, as law requires, takes into account all available information
should, it would seem, hue closely to proximate market data. Magellan’s valuations for these 5
firms prior to their IPOs show no discernable pattern that would help to explain why that was not
the case.

187

The first and third quarter reports are filed on Form N-Q, which have a 60-day deadline. See
Form N-Q, supra note 56, at 1. Form N-CSRs are filed for the alternate quarters. These must be
filed in 70 days. See 17 § CFR 270.30e-1 (2016) (requiring semi-annual reports within 60 days
of each half-year period); Form N-CSR, supra note 56, 1 (requiring filing not later than 10 days
after delivery of a semiannual report).
57

DRAFT
iv. Returns Smoothing
As noted above, rather than inflate valuations so as to exaggerate returns, funds could
smooth returns by shifting the timing of when they reflect gains and losses. If a fund is engaged
in within-portfolio smoothing, it would show up as an inverse correlation between the fund’s
return on its startup portfolio and the return on its remaining investments. If a fund is smoothing
against a benchmark (the S&P 500 in Magellan’s case), this would show up as an inverse
correlation between the performance of Magellan’s startup investments and the remaining
portion of the fund’s performance relative to its benchmark. As illustrated in the scatterplots
below, however, the relevant figures showed little correlation.188

Figure 6
Startup Quaterly Portfolio Returns Compared to Remaining
Quarterly Portfolio Returns
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The correlation coefficient for Figure 6 is -.05 and for Figure 7 is -.03.
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Figure 7
Startup Quarterly Portfolio Returns Compared to Relative
Benchmark Performance
Startup Quarterly Portfolio Returns
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One reason smoothing might not appear is that, when Fidelity invests in a startup, it
frequently spreads its holdings across more than one fund. Thus, while Fidelity might not be
smoothing with respect to Magellan, it might be doing so with respect to the fund family as a
whole—timing the valuation of gains and losses to the benefit of whichever fund in the family is
most in need of support—and such behavior would not reveal itself in the above analysis.

v. Interpretation of Magellan’s Valuations
The data above does not provide a clear answer as to whether Magellan is inappropriately
valuing its startups. There does not appear to be evidence of smoothing and the pricing of firms
that went public shows no pattern of overvaluation. The comparison of private valuations to IPO
prices does, however, call the rigor of the valuation process into doubt, and the comparison of
VC portfolio returns to other investments supports concerns about misconduct.
Upwardly skewed valuations are one of only a few explanations for the fund’s success in
the VC arena. And the alternative explanations, while plausible, are not overly compelling. It
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would be tempting to dismiss Magellan’s success as the byproduct of a startup bubble, but this
would be too easy. While many have voiced concerns that startups are overvalued,189 to attribute
Magellan’s performance to a bubble requires an explanation for why Magellan is benefiting
more from it than others in the VC industry.190 No convincing explanations present themselves.
It is possible that Magellan is more skillful, but this seems improbable given the fund’s
inexperience. This leaves luck. While anything is possible over a relatively short period of time,
ascribing Magellan’s performance to good fortune is not a particularly satisfactory explanation
either.
Surprisingly strong relative performance does not prove manipulation or disprove other
explanations, but it is notable nonetheless. The valuation data could have shown that the VC
investments were an unrelenting drag on returns. While this would not have disproven
manipulation, it would have run counter to the theory that mutual funds are using such
investments and their discretion over valuations as a way to boost their returns in an absolute
sense and in comparison to index funds. Such a finding would also have eased regulatory
concerns. Even if funds are manipulating valuations to show results that are less bad than they
really are, this is part of a self-defeating investment strategy and therefore probably a short-term
problem. Instead, the finding of superior performance lends credence to overvaluation concerns.

189

See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, Expect Some Unicorns to Lose Their Horns, and It
Won’t Be Pretty, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan 19, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/20/business/dealbook/expect-some-unicorns-to-lose-theirhorns-and-it-wont-be-pretty.html?_r=0.
190
If there is a bubble, mutual funds might be part of the reason for why it exists. Their presence
may exert upward pressure on prices because they have vast resources and their inexperience and
discretion over subsequent valuations may lead to price insensitivity.
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This article proves, as much as a case study can, that mutual fund VC holdings and
valuation processes are not disclosed in a useful manner. It also makes the theoretical case for
skepticism regarding the startup valuations mutual funds announce each quarter. To assess the
theoretical case, the article reviews Magellan’s valuations and measures them against several
benchmarks. While Magellan’s valuations and the associated returns are comparatively and
surprisingly high, there is insufficient evidence to pin such success on misconduct. Nevertheless,
the above combination of theory and evidence—along with the mutual fund industry’s expanding
taste for VC investments—provides enough reason for concern to begin a conversation about
reform.191
While disclosure is almost always the recommended cure for securities-law concerns, that
alone would likely be insufficient in this instance. Many, even most, investors likely pay scant
attention to mandated fund disclosures or even the content of fund websites.192 While this does
not mean the pursuit of improved disclosure is in vain, it does suggest that substantive reforms to
how mutual funds are permitted to do business should be the centerpiece and that any new
disclosure recommendations should be calibrated to the reality of low investor engagement.

191

There is a regulatory tradeoff with respect to empirical evidence of misconduct. The more
evidence one collects, the better the case for regulation, but the more harm that has already been
done. While the case here is mostly theoretical, since the startup investing trend remains
nascent, this may present an opportunity for regulators to get ahead of the industry.
192
See supra note 18.
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A. Reforms to the Valuation Process and Related Disclosures
Currently, securities rules require funds to value their portfolios daily, and the accounting
requirements as to methodology allow funds to do so through any reasonable means.193 Because
funds are required to constantly value their securities, this is a pure “mark-to-market” accounting
structure, and because the process of marking to market is what creates the opportunity for
manipulation, a modified cost-based accounting structure would mitigate such concerns.
Funds could be required to hold these investments at their acquisition cost, unless the
fund believes a valuation change is warranted based on publicly available information. For
instance, startups often announce their implicit valuation based on new rounds of financing.194
When this occurs, funds could be required to update their valuations accordingly. Management
shakeups, acquisitions, and even industry news could warrant changes.
As a complement to the new valuation rules, funds could be required to disclose each
quarter what public information caused the change. This is a rather mild form of intervention
because it leaves pricing in the discretion of the fund and anticipates market-based revisions.195

193

See supra Part III.C.5.
See, e.g., Press Release, Shazam, Shazam Announces $30 Million Investment at $1 Billion
Valuation (Jan 20. 2015), http://news.shazam.com/pressreleases/shazam-announces-30-millioninvestment-at-1-billion-valuation-1107744.
195
Rules could also require disclosure of whether the fund is using a third-party pricing service.
The value of these services can be questioned: they may also struggle to price VC investments,
and they may be pressured to value such investments in conformity with management’s wishes.
Nevertheless, they have been shown to reduce smoothing in the hedge-fund context. See Gavin
Cassar & Joseph Gerakos, Hedge Funds: Pricing Controls and the Smoothing of Self-Reported
Returns, 24 REV. FIN. STUDIES 1698, 1700 (2011). While not necessarily probative of what
would happen in the mutual-fund arena, evidence from Sarbanes-Oxley shows that disclosure of
whether a publicly traded firm adopts a shareholder-friendly practice leads to an increased
adoption of that practice. See James S. Linck et al., The Effects and Unintended Consequences
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors, 22 REV. FIN. STUDIES 3387,
3292, 3310-11 (2009) (showing an increase in the number of financial experts on corporate
boards after Sarbanes-Oxley required disclosure of whether companies had such individuals on
their audit committees).
194
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But the rationale for revised valuations would be subject to public scrutiny, which would
incentivize funds to provide more conservative (and more careful) estimates—ones they could
publicly defend if called upon. Mutual-fund investors would be unlikely to notice these
disclosures, but the audience in this case would be the SEC, class-action lawyers, and the media.
Indeed, the SEC and major newspapers have already begun to take note of mutual-fund valuation
practices.196
Funds would likely argue that such disclosures pose competitive concerns. As the
opaque nature of their disclosures suggest, funds like to leave the public in the dark as to their
practices. Similarly, when reporters have asked funds about valuation techniques, they are often
met with silence or platitudes.197 The disclosures proposed here, however, would not
compromise fund valuation models; only the publicly available information on which changes
are based would be open for review Such complaints are, therefore, unconvincing.
This proposal is the least intrusive from an array of options. The most extreme
alternative would be to prohibit mutual funds from making VC investments. Instead, only ETFs
and closed end funds would be allowed to do so. While similar to mutual funds, the shares for
these pooled investments are publicly traded, which means any disconnect between fund
valuations and market value would be accounted for in the price of the shares.198 Like in the

196

See Kristen Grind, Regulators Look into Mutual Funds’ Procedures for Valuing Startups,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/regulators-look-intomutual-funds-procedures-for-valuing-startups-1447796553; McLaughlin & Somerville, supra
note 5; see, e.g., Grind, supra note 196; Sorkin, supra note 1.
197
See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 112; Grind, supra note 196; The Rise and Fall of the
Unicorns, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28., 2015, available at
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public markets, unsophisticated shareholders would be protected by the market price.199 The
problem is that this would cut many ordinary investors out from startup investing. ETFs and
closed-end funds do not have the same footprint as mutual funds, and they are not as common in
401(k) plans.200 Without clear evidence of misconduct, it is better to mitigate the risk of abuse,
than deprive people of the opportunity to invest in young companies.
One could allow mutual-fund participation, but remove the risk of misconduct, by taking
valuation discretion away from the funds. Instead, they could be required to hold the
investments at cost. In contrast to the modified cost-based proposal presented above, with this
option, the market value would only enter the NAV calculation if there is a liquidity event, such
as the sale of shares in an emerging firm. The problem, and the reason I propose milder
intervention, is that this change would open an arbitrage opportunity for sophisticated investors.
Suppose a company enters a later funding round at an increased valuation. After the round, the
fund’s recorded NAV would be artificially low. Arbitrageurs could purchase shares in the fund
in anticipation of when the value would actually be realized. The same is true on the flip side. A
requirement to hold the firms at cost would mean that funds would carry inflated valuations for
firms in cases where there has been bad news. Arbitrageurs could sell fund shares only to
repurchase them if the firm eventually goes bankrupt.
The underlying problem is that a purely cost-based system creates a predictable
divergence between announced values and market values. In a typical public market, the actions
of sophisticated traders help retail investors as their conduct brings prices in line with market
values. But in the mutual fund context, the NAV stays the same. The profits of the arbitragers
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come at the expense of long-term, presumably retail, investors.201 Under the modified cost-based
approach I propose, however, while a difference between market price and reported price
difference might exist in theory, it would be impossible to exploit because the information on
which to do so would not be publicly available.202
A similar alternative would be to require updating, when and only when, there are certain
outside events (e.g., a new funding round, an acquisition, bankruptcy). The ability to alter
valuations subject to these constraints would allow greater flexibility than the purely cost-based
alternative. While this approach would reduce the arbitrage problem, it would not eliminate it.
Sophisticated investors could buy or sell based on whatever events are not included on the list.
Additional research may indicate that more restrictive measures may be appropriate, but
at this point, where research is still thin, incremental change seems most prudent. The suggested
alteration to the valuation process, and the accompanying disclosure rule, would provide a great
deal more investor protection than today’s regime without significant upheaval.203
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B. Startup Portfolio Disclosure
A limitation to the changes discussed thus far is that they would not address the investor
notice problem. While the SEC and sophisticated investors would be more aware of fund
valuation practices, the presence of venture-stage firms in fund portfolios, and the risks they
pose, would still be unknown to most investors. As noted above, this is a difficult problem to fix
because investors are notoriously uninterested in fund disclosures.204 With this in mind, rules
should mandate disclosures across an array of platforms, including both fund advertisements and
SEC forms, so as to reach as many investors as possible, and require that such disclosures be
simple and clear enough so that those investors that come across them understand that the fund is
investing in startups and the risks involved. This would provide actual notice to some investors
and constructive notice to all.205
Such an approach starts with a rule that instructs funds with venture investments to
include something like the following disclaimer whenever they present their fund strategy,
including in its website and prospectus: “This fund contains investments in startup companies.
Such investments pose unique risks, which are discussed in further detail in the ‘Startup
Portfolio’ section of our Statement of Additional Information.”
This section would then describe such risks. It would explain that such firms are illiquid
and that this may make it difficult for funds to redeem mutual-fund shares on demand. Funds
could appropriately tailor this discussion according to the portion of the fund’s portfolio so
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invested. Funds would also be required to explain the valuation challenges with startups. In
particular, funds should indicate that valuing startups is inherently subjective and that
exaggerated valuations lead to excess compensation for management, which means that the
interests of the fund’s managers do not align with that of its shareholders.
The fund would then explain the process it uses to value startups and mitigate concerns
regarding its discretion and potential bias. In this part, the fund would describe what it does
rather than what it may do. For example, media reports suggest that funds use market behavior
of similar public companies to estimate emerging firm values.206 If this is the case, then firms
should acknowledge it. One problem with today’s disclosures is that fund’s provide a broad
discussion of their process for valuing assets without a readily identifiable market value.
Because they apply this process to a range of assets, the discussion is so general as to be
meaningless. This proposal would require that firms specifically discuss what they do to fair
value startups. To accommodate competitive concerns, funds would not be required to disclose
the details of their valuation models. In the example above, for instance, a fund using public
valuations to inform private ones would not be required to list which public company or
companies it is using as a match for which startup.
The SAI would also inform investors that the current list of holdings, including
valuations, can be found in the fund’s quarterly reports. In addition, it would explain that the
fund, as required by law, updates valuations when, and only when, publicly available
information warrants doing so, and that it reports the basis of such changes each quarter. In the
quarterly reports, startups should be specially marked as such with a footnote indicating that
investors can learn more about such investments and their risks in the fund’s SAI. This specific

206

See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 112.
67

DRAFT
and clear disclosure regime would offer far more insight than the generalized and superficial
information found in Magellan’s reports today.
Even though the SEC has expressed concern about the length and complexity of fund
disclosures, venture investing warrants special treatment. As discussed throughout this article,
such investments are uniquely illiquid and difficult to value and are quite different than the
typical equity mutual-fund holdings or even holdings in debt and other illiquid securities, which
raise similar concerns. Though the substantive reforms to the valuation process discussed above
would reduce the fund’s discretion and therefore do much to mitigate the risk of manipulation, it
would not eliminate this concern or the need for transparency with respect to funds’ VC
portfolios.

V. CONCLUSION
A case study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s compliance effort and investing practices
suggests that the current regulatory structure does not adequately address the investor-protection
concerns raised by mutual-fund investments in startups. The study suggests that most fund
investors are unaware that they have indirectly invested in these companies, which is particularly
worrisome because the valuations funds report for these firms, and which form the basis of
investor transactions, may be biased and inaccurate. A review of Magellan’s valuations, and the
performance related thereto, lend preliminary support to these concerns. To respond to the
investor-protection gaps, I propose greater limitations on how funds may value their investments
in startups and enhanced disclosure requirements with respect to the valuation process, the
presence of such firms in fund portfolios, and the risks that investing in startups entails.
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